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, McQueen and Roley (1993) , Almeida et al. (1998) , Elton (1999) , Balduzzi et al. (2001) , Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002) , Andersen et al. (2003) , Green (2004) , Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) , Hautsch and Hess (2007) , Evans and Lyons (2008) , and Hautsch et al. (2010) , to cite only a few.
3 forecast rationality studies largely test for general quality properties derived from Muth's Rational Expectations Hypothesis (1961) 2 . As a common outcome, general forecast rationality studies provide no evidence of systematic and persistent inefficiencies. 3 In contrast, Campbell and Sharpe (2009) test for a specific behavioral inefficiency, the anchoring bias, first documented by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) in psychological experiments. Anchoring implies that too much weight is attached to a certain prior available piece of information. In the context of macroeconomic forecasts it would mean that the surveyed analyst puts too much importance on the last months' actual and therefore underweights other important information. Thus the entire information set available at the survey date would not be efficiently incorporated in the forecast generation process. But then, utilizing the entire available information correctly must yield improved forecasts. Only if this is the case, the widely used survey forecasts would have to be viewed as inefficient and poor proxies of market participant's expectations.
However, we cannot reach this conclusion. In contrast, our analysis reveals a counter-intuitive result: Despite a seemingly strong and statistically significant anchoring bias in most macroeconomic survey series, adjusting forecasts for the seemingly apparent bias leads to no systematic forecast improvements. Decomposing the anchoring bias test statistic provides an explanation for this puzzling result: the test itself is biased. Testing solely against univariate time series information the anchoring bias test neglects the possibility that analysts may provide superior forecasts by using a richer information set than just the univariate time series itself. Our empirical results support this explanation, revealing for a broad range of macroeconomic series that efficiency -rather than inefficiency -is producing the large "anchoring bias" coefficients. By arranging a "horse race" between survey and model 2 See e.g. Pesando (1975) , and Mullineaux (1978) Pearce and Roley (1985) , Aggarwal et al. (1995) , and Schirm (2003) . 3 The most recent study, Schirm (2003) , finds only for small number of investigated series some bias. However his results partly contradict the findings of Aggarwal et al. (1995) obtained on a different sample.
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forecasts we document that analysts' forecasts aggregate more valuable information than contained in the historical time series and are therefore quite efficient. This forecast comparison is a distinctive contribution to the existing forecast quality literature. While previous studies assumed efficiency, we are the first to hypothesize inefficiency. Rejecting this hypothesis provides evidence in favor of efficient information processing by analysts.
Our more general approach allows us to address the more interesting question whether analyst forecasts represent the best available information aggregate instead of testing whether one single piece of information was incorrectly incorporated.
Our analysis proceeds in five steps. First we replicate the anchoring bias test of Campbell and Sharpe (2009) . However, we use a much broader set of macroeconomic indicators, allowing for a more comprehensive analysis. More importantly, we use a much longer sample period to facilitate out-of-sample tests. This "dynamic" analysis, i.e. testing on a rolling-window and correspondingly adjusting forecasts out-of-sample, enables us to build on the exact information flow, i.e. to consider only information available to market participants at a given point in time. Hence, our procedure avoids a look-ahead bias. This is of particular importance when we adjust the data for the anchoring bias, because only this real-time proceeding ensures a realistic comparison of unadjusted and adjusted data. In contrast, Campbell and Sharpe's analysis (which we call "static") is based on a single in-sample regression and a corresponding adjustment would incorporate a potentially severe look-ahead bias.
If the highly significant anchoring coefficients would stem from a cognitive bias, then adjusting the original survey forecasts must yield substantial improvements in forecast quality. Surprisingly, despite highly significant anchoring coefficients we can hardly find any significant improvements in forecast quality when adjusting for this seemingly apparent bias.
Only when we allow for a look-ahead bias, i.e. for the statical estimation and adjustment, we find some modest improvements. More importantly and even more disturbingly, we can find 5 virtually no improvements of forecast quality for the dynamically estimated anchoring coefficients, which avoid a look-ahead bias. Only for 2 out of 23 series we can find statistically significant improvements, but for another 2 series forecast quality significantly worsens through the adjustment. Overall, we have to conclude that nothing is gained by adjusting forecasts, despite highly significant anchoring test coefficients.
In order to explain this puzzling result we inspect in a third step the mechanics of the anchoring bias test. Most importantly, the anchoring bias test implicitly assumes a univariate time series framework. This creates a substantial problem since it neglects other information which most likely alters rational forecasts. In particular, we show that the overall test statistic can be decomposed into two components: The first component captures inefficient processing of univariate time series information, possibly due to anchoring. The second component, however, captures superior information processing abilities of analysts, supposedly due to using a richer information set. Hence, large and significant anchoring coefficients can not only arise when analysts face a cognitive bias but also when they correctly incorporate additional information in their predictions and therefore outperform time series forecasts. This suggests that neglecting other information may be responsible for the misleading anchoring bias test results. In fact, in line with previous research on the properties of stock market analysts' forecasts, 4 we find that macroeconomic survey forecasts substantially outperform optimized time series forecasts. Overall, this analysis shows that the anchoring bias test is biased itself. Large coefficients could be just due to efficient -rather than inefficientinformation processing.
Outperforming optimal univariate time-series forecasts implies that analysts have to use some additional information while generating their forecast. In fact, in a fourth step, we provide evidence supporting the view that macroeconomic analysts use a much broader information set than just the univariate time series. In particular, we find that a substantial part of the forecast improvement analysts achieve over time series models can be explained by other macroeconomic data. This result suggests that analysts draw on several other macroeconomic indicators. We find that in particular those macroeconomic figures that are identified to be the most "important" ones by Gilbert et. al. (2010) , i.e. those with substantial information content and those being released early in the monthly release cycle seem to contribute. Consequently, analysts seem to be rather efficient information processors pooling a large amount of valuable information.
Fifth, we quantify the relative contributions of the "inefficiency" and the "additional information" component to the overall anchoring bias test coefficient. Our results suggest that for the majority of significantly biased forecast series, the "additional information" component accounts for more than half of the overall anchoring bias coefficients' size. This explains the puzzling result that almost all survey forecasts seem to be severely anchoring biased while an adjustment does not lead to improvements.
Overall, our analysis yields an astonishing result. Rather than detecting inefficiencies in U.S.
macroeconomic survey forecasts we find strong evidence for superior information processing abilities of analysts. The highly significant anchoring bias test results are not due to a cognitive bias of analysts, but result from their superiority compared to time series models. ( )
The unbiased estimator for next month's actual already incorporates all available information efficiently. The inclusion of additional past information is redundant and therefore λ should be one. A value of λ significantly smaller than one would suggests anchoring, i.e. putting too much weight on previously released values in comparison to an unbiased estimator.
Since the unbiased estimator is unobservable a direct estimation of equation (1) is not feasible. It can be shown that an indirect estimation of λ is possible by means of (2) (see Appendix A for a derivation): 
Equation (3) in connection with γ estimated on the basis of (2), the original forecast data can be adjusted for the anchoring induced bias. These adjusted forecasts serve as central input variables for our forecast quality comparison tests to determine the economical significance of the anchoring bias. We perform two different adjustments. First, to evaluate the in-sample impact of the anchoring bias we estimate (2) over the entire sample period and adjust the forecasts retrospectively. Additionally, to avoid an in-sample look-ahead bias, we perform a dynamic adjustment by means of a rolling estimation of (2). Given the current coefficient we adjust the next forecast in a way market participants would have been able to adjust the data. 
To separate the part of γ driven by the additional information set measured by t Z we decompose γ ɵ into two parts 
and
with ( ) 1 t x − would allow to predict the innovation t e , then "old" time series information would yield a more precise forecast than the survey forecast. In this case analysts' forecast (or the models they use) would be inefficient. Therefore, 1 γ captures inefficiencies in analysts' forecasts. Since additional information, t Z , is not directly observable we have to use a proxy measure.
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The basic idea is to generate an optimal univariate time-series forecast to extract t Z as the residual from the MMS survey forecast. First, we estimate an "optimal" ARIMA model for the actual. We select the optimal order of differencing d according to a Phillips-Perron test.
Then we estimate the model for all combinations of p = 0, …, 6 and q = 0, 1. We chose the best fitting model according to Bayes' information criterion (BIC) among those models providing residuals that are not serially correlated. Based on this selection procedure, we obtain an "optimal" time series model to describe the actual. The generated residuals of this model serve as proxy measure for the innovation of the actual generating process ( t ε ), i.e., the For this purpose we estimate the following model:
where t Z denotes the approximated additional information component in survey forecasts and t M a vector containing the available macroeconomic information set for the 23 considered indicators seven days prior to an announcement. Using a stepwise regression approach allows us to determine whether t Z is an inappropriate proxy for additional information or whether it is related to other macroeconomic news.
Finally we quantify the contribution of the "additional information" and the "inefficiency" component to the overall anchoring bias coefficient. Based on our theoretical considerations including equation (5) and (6) a partition is feasible and we can conclude whether irrationality or information efficiency drives the anchoring bias test results.
II. Data Description
We use a comprehensive data set comprising 23 well known macroeconomic indicators. 
a. Anchoring tests results
We start with a "static" or in-sample test design and estimate equation (2) on the full sample for three different specifications of h , where 1 h = corresponds to anchoring on the last month's actual only and 2 h = or 3 to anchoring on the mean of the two or three previously announced actual values, respectively. Since the static test involves a serious lookahead-bias we perform a "dynamic" analysis in addition, estimating the anchoring coefficients on a rolling window with a fixed length of 10 years. weight on last month's release and about 96% on the expected value, i.e., the unbiased forecast. In contrast, for consumer confidence (CC) it seems that the unbiased estimator and the previously released actual enter the MMS forecast with approximately equal weights.
Results of the dynamic anchoring tests are given in Table 3 Although the dynamic test results appear to be slightly weaker overall they are akin to the static test outcomes. For both static and dynamic we get sizable γ coefficients for most of the macroeconomic forecast series indicating substantial anchoring. At first sight this suggests partly predictable surprises and portends a poor quality of the frequently used MMS forecasts.
Consequently this questions their appropriateness as proxy measures for market participants' expectations.
b. Can anchoring adjustments improve analysts' forecasts?
Given the highly significant and sizable anchoring coefficients we would expect that analysts' forecast can be substantially improved by adjusting them according to equation (3). Results are given in By construction, the static (or in-sample) adjustments cannot yield a larger RMSFE of the adjusted series. Nevertheless, the improvements are rather small. We observe a reduction of 8.38% at best. Moreover, the Diebold Mariano tests find that only about 60% of the significantly biased forecast series can be improved. This is somewhat surprising since the static anchoring tests make use of forward looking information. Naturally, one would expect significant forecast changes whenever we get a significant anchoring test coefficient, at least for the static case.
The results of dynamic adjustments are much worse. When we adjust forecasts dynamically,
i.e. without using forward looking information, almost no improvements can be obtained.
There are only two exceptions, CC and DGO for which we obtain significantly improved forecasts according to the Diebold-Mariano test on differences in MSE. These correspond to a reduction in RMSFEs of nearly 8% for CC and less than 6% for DGO. On the other hand, we observe also two cases with significantly worsening forecast errors, i.e. NF and TRD. For all other series, changes in forecast errors are insignificant though large in some cases. For example, we observe the largest though insignificant forecast error change for RS, worsening the series' RMSFE by around 15%. Since the dynamical adjustment best represents market participants' approach to correct for the cognitive bias our results provide strong evidence against the economical significance of the anchoring bias.
Moreover, note that the size of the anchoring coefficient is at best loosely related to the improvements. For instance the durable goods orders bias coefficient is 0.398 and results in 10 The test we apply includes the small sample adjustment of Harvey, Leybourne and Newbold (1997) .
an RMFSE improvement of about 4.6%. In contrast the personal consumption expenditures anchoring bias coefficient is only 0.189 and leads to a considerable larger RMFSE reduction of about 7%. This odd pattern provides evidence that the anchoring bias test results might be misleading, i.e., a sizable γ does not necessarily lead to large forecast improvements.
c. Incremental forecast improvement over time series models
Our theoretical analysis provides a possible -though disturbing -explanation for the disconnection of forecast improvements and γ -coefficients. Equation (6) suggests that we may find a significant anchoring bias simply because analysts provide sophisticated forecasts by incorporating additional information beyond the univariate time-series information. This is definitely not unreasonable. To analyze this issue, we compare analysts' median forecasts t F for a given month t with an "optimal" univariate time series forecast TS t F . To obtain an optimal forecast series without a look-ahead bias, we estimate various time series models using a rolling window. More precisely, for each point in time 1 t − we estimate a broad range of different ARIMA (p,d,q) specifications (i.e. all combinations of p = 1, …,6, d = 0,1, and q = 0,1) using the last 10 years of data. Out of these we select the best fitting model according to the BIC. The estimated coefficients of this best fitting model are then used to produce a one-period-ahead time-series forecast TS t F for period t . Then we shift the estimation window by one observation and repeat the procedure to obtain a forecast for the next period. Concatenating these one-stepahead forecasts, we obtain a time series of optimal forecasts.
Summary statistics for this optimal forecasts series are given in Table 5 . The first column reports the parameters p, d, q for the most frequently best fitting ARIMA model. For example,
for CC a specification with p=1, d=0 and q=0, i.e. a simple AR(1) model, turns out to provide the best fit in most cases. An even simpler model emerges for ISM: the most frequently optimal specification is p=0, d=1 and q=0, i.e. a model in first differences including solely a constant term. Thus for ISM the most frequently optimal model is a random walk with drift.
Similarly for the majority of the other series the optimal model is rather simple. In most cases we find an AR(1), MA(1), or ARMA(1,1) processes (after first differencing) to be optimal.
Only a few series call for second or third order processes.
Note that our time series of one-step-ahead forecasts TS t F estimated on a rolling window exploits the historical time series information available at any point in time most efficiently, but at the same time, avoids a look-ahead bias. In this sense it provides a benchmark for analysts' forecasts. Anchoring is equivalent to overestimating the influence of past observations, e.g. using a larger than optimal first-order autoregressive parameter when applying an AR(1) model. Hence, if analysts produce forecasts that are more or less strongly anchoring biased we would expect that an efficiently estimated time series model (avoiding this bias) outperforms analysts' forecasts. However, this only holds if the underperformance induced by the anchoring bias outweighs the overperformance resulting from the use of a broader information set. This is definitely not the case. Columns 2 and 3 of Outperforming a model which optimally exploits univariate time series information can only stem from using a richer information set. To extract the forecast component which is unrelated to historical announcements (i.e., t Z ) we use the procedure described in section 1.
Based on a distributed lag model, we decompose t F into a component explained by historical time series information and a residual ˆt Z . Now, this residual could just represent noise picked up by analysts when producing their forecasts. In this case ˆt Z would not help to predict t A , or more precisely, would be uncorrelated with our estimate of the innovation in t A , i.e., ˆt e .
Correlations of ˆt Z and ˆt e are reported in Table 6 . Most importantly, we find solely positive and highly significant correlations of ˆt Z and ˆt e . This strongly suggests that ˆt Z represents not just noise being picked up somehow by analysts. In contrast, the additional information component in analysts' forecasts is able to predict some part of the innovation in 20 announcements. Since our approximated innovation ˆt e constitutes the unpredictable part in an announcement after employing optimally univariate time-series information, the high correlation of ˆt Z and ˆt e also suggests that analysts' superior forecasting abilities stem from the incorporation of valuable additional information. Again, this finding is in line with studies analyzing stock analysts' forecast performance. For instance Fried and Givoly (1982) document that stock analysts' outperformance over time-series models is based on autonomous, i.e. additional information.
One potential source of valuable additional information are other macroeconomic news. Due to interrelations between macroeconomic indicators it is quite plausible that analysts utilize these releases in their forecast generation process. Therefore, other macroeconomic news should be able to, at least partly, explain the additional information approximated by ˆt Z .
Especially indicators released early in the cycle and those with large information content about the state of the economy should be useful (Gilbert et. al. 2010) . As described in Section I we regress ˆt Z on all macroeconomic information available seven days prior to the announcements using a stepwise regression approach to identify the most influential indicators. Table 7 shows the regression results for selected indicators. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out that analysts' forecasts may still contain some behavioral bias. At least, our results suggest that the advantage of using a richer information set by far exceeds possible disadvantages associated with behavioral biases.
d. Decomposition of anchoring test results
Coming back to the question why the anchoring test produces so significant results, the high correlations of ˆt Z and ˆt e may provide an answer. According to equations (4) to (6) we can decompose the anchoring coefficient γ into an "inefficiency" component 1 γ and an "additional information" component 2 γ . Table 9 provides statistics on 1 γ and 2 γ . For comparison, static as well as dynamic γ -estimates are displayed in columns 1 and 2, respectively. Column 3 shows the approximated γ calculated on the basis of equation (4). In addition, columns 4 and 5 show the two components of γ , i.e., the "inefficiency" component 1 γ and the "additional information" component 2 γ .
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The results clearly show that the additional information component 2 γ is largely responsible for a substantial part of the overall γ . Considering the macroeconomic series with a significantly positive anchoring bias coefficient, we find that in 11 out of 16 cases 2 γ accounts for more than 50% of γ . In two additional cases 2 γ accounts for more than 25%.
The theoretical decomposition analysis has already shown that the anchoring test can produce biased results due to the "additional information" component it contains. 11 The empirical results now show that this "additional information" component is quite large for most macroeconomic series. This clearly indicates that the test itself includes a bias which is substantial.
These findings also provide an explanation for the puzzling forecast improvement results. If the anchoring bias test does not solely measure a cognitive bias, it is not surprising that controlling for such a bias cannot significantly change the quality of survey forecasts.
IV. Conclusion
The anchoring bias test recently suggested by Campbell and Sharpe (2009) indicates that the survey forecasts for a broad range of US macroeconomic releases are severely biased. This irrationality implies that survey forecasts could be substantially improved when we control for the bias. Surprisingly, applying a dynamic test and adjustment procedure we find hardly any forecast improvements. Our theoretical analysis explains this puzzling empirical result:
Focusing on the univariate time-series properties of announcements the anchoring test neglects the possibility that analysts draw on a more comprehensive information set. Given the univariate setting of the anchoring test, our "horse race" of survey forecasts against univariate time series model forecasts clearly shows that analysts have superior information 11 An adjustment based solely on 1 γ leads to comparable results and is therefore not reported.
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processing abilities. Most likely, their outperformance is due to using a richer information set embracing more than just the univariate macroeconomic series. Obviously, analysts have access to a lot more information, for example, other related macroeconomic data or recent policy statements. We find that analysts use other macroeconomic information to generate their forecasts. Especially indicators released early in the month and those with much content about current and future economic activity are part of their information set.
Our empirical decomposition of the estimated anchoring bias coefficients shows that analysts' outperformance has a strong impact on the anchoring test. For the majority of significant anchoring tests, the "additional information" component explains more than half the size of the overall anchoring coefficient. This leads us to conclude that the anchoring test is highly misleading. In the majority of cases efficiency -not inefficiency -leads to the statistical significant results.
Given the strong bias in the test and the weak forecast improvements associated with anchoring adjustments, the economical significance of anchoring in macroeconomic surveys is more than questionable. Overall, our results suggest that there is no reason to question the results of earlier studies using the MMS macroeconomic forecasts.
An intriguing question for further research is therefore whether and to what extent macroeconomic analysts could outperform more sophisticated time series models. Naturally, a statistical model will never be able to capture the entire available information set. However, model based forecasts should be free of any cognitive bias. Yet, in order to obtain better forecasting models it is necessary to develop a better understanding of the factors driving the outperformance of analysts. While we cannot rule out with certainty that analysts' forecasts may contain some bias, our results clearly show that analysts' forecasts substantially 24 outperform time series forecasts. Finally we have to conclude that survey forecasts provide the best available approximation of market participant's expectations.
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Appendix A
As stated the direct estimation of ( )
is not possible. However the estimation becomes feasible by means of the well known definition of the unanticipated news component of a macroeconomic release:
where t S denotes the unanticipated news component called surprise, t A the actual announced value of the macroeconomic indicator and t F the survey based forecast. Taking the expectation of equation (9) and rearranging it leads to: (8) with (10) gives the model for the further investigation:
For reasons of clarity we define the slope coefficient in our model as:
Therefore the regression model for the test of the anchoring bias is given by 12 :
( )
Appendix B
Assume that t A follows an ARMA(p,q) process without constant term, i.e., 
i.e. as an infinite MA process. For example, for an ARMA(1,1) we get Hence t Z reflects deviations of analysts' forecasts from purely time series based forecasts, or the influence of "other information" (besides past announcements) on analyst' forecasts.
The coefficient γ of the anchoring regression is given by 
) indicators seven days prior to an announcement. A stepwise regression approach was used to obtain the models. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (5) show the corresponding approximations of γ and its decomposition into an "inefficiency" ( 1 γ ) and an "additional information" ( 2 γ ) component:
